In this paper, we study a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations, endogenous fertility and public pensions. By assuming CobbDouglas technology and logarithmic preferences, we show that the introduction of a fertility-related component in the pay-as-you-go pension scheme may destabilise the long-term equilibrium and cause endogenous fluctuations when individuals have static expectations. The possibility of cyclical instability increases (resp. reduces) when both the subjective discount factor and relative weight of individual fertility in pay-as-you-go pensions (resp. the parents' taste for children) increase(s). Interestingly, when public pensions are contingent on the individual number of children, the financing of smallsized benefits may cause the occurrence of a flip bifurcation, two-period cycles and cycles of a higher order. In addition, we show through numerical simulations that these results hold in a more general setting with a constant inter-temporal elasticity of substitution utility function and a constant elasticity of substitution production function. Our findings identify a possible novel factor responsible for persistent deterministic fluctuations in a context of overlapping generations, while also representing a policy warning regarding the destabilising effects of fertility-related pension reforms, which are currently high in both the theoretical debate and the political agendas of several developed countries.
Introduction
Social security is a pillar of the welfare state in several developed countries. It is essentially based on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pensions, i.e. those in work finance the pensions of those who are retired. The fertility crisis that is affecting an increasing number of countries (e.g. Germany, Italy, Japan and Spain) is threatening the viability of public pension budgets, as the number of young contributors is steadily falling and the number of old beneficiaries is steadily rising. This phenomenon is also being aggravated by reduced adult mortality (Fogel 2004; Livi-Bacci 2006) . Motivated by concerns of ageing and belowreplacement fertility on the existence of the PAYG system, pension reforms are currently high on the political agendas of several governments, especially in Europe (Boeri et al. 2001 (Boeri et al. , 2002 Blinder and Krueger 2004) .
It has been suggested that families should be offered incentives to have more children so as to increase the ratio of economically active people to the total population, for instance, through the public provision of child allowances (van Groezen et al. 2003; van Groezen and Meijdam 2008) or, alternatively, by linking the size of the pension transfer to the individual number of children (Kolmar 1997; Abio et al. 2004; Meier 2005, 2009; Cigno and Werding 2007) . This is the so-called fertility-related pension policy.
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Although fertility-related (henceforth FR) pensions already exist in some countries, 2 several economists and policy makers argue for a further extension. Sinn (2007, p. 10) argues for instance that the current fertility-related element in the German pension system is too low: "The pension system in Germany provides some relief for mothers who raise an additional child and work ten years after the birth. They receive, in terms of current value, 11,000 Euros as an additional pension. This is close to nothing." With regard to policy proposals, Cigno et al. (2003b) investigate the effectiveness of pension benefits contingent on the actual (or potential) earning capacity of the pensioner's own children (see also Cigno 2007; Cigno and Werding 2007 ). This reform is also able to make operational the theoretical findings of Cigno et al. (2003b Cigno et al. ( , 2004 , according to which it can help to avoid the following: (1) that parents substitute quantity for quality of children (Cigno et al. 2003b ) and (2) the existence of moral hazard problems because parents' investment (in terms of both time and money) on children is not observable by governments (Cigno et al. 2004) .
Empirical evidence regarding the effects of FR cash benefits or tax breaks on fertility is controversial. In fact, as noted by Cigno (2010, p. 27) , while in the short term it has been invariably found that FR cash benefits encourage fertility, they may solely represent a change in the timing of fertility behaviour (such as the trend that gave rise to a baby boom in the 1960s), rather than a change in completed cohort fertility. By contrast, the long-term effects appear to be small (as surveyed by Schultz 2008) . For instance, Cigno et al. (2003a) estimate the long-term elasticity of the total fertility rate with respect to child benefit rate of only 0.23 for Germany. 3 More significantly perhaps, Cigno and Werding (2007) investigate what would have happened to the total fertility rate from 1995 to the time of writing and from that date to 2020, according to five alternative scenarios by exploiting the fact that the German public pension system became an FR system in 1996. Their simulations seem to show that the same long-term fertility rates can be obtained either by drastically cutting back the pension coverage and increasing fertility subsidies or by making pension benefits contingent on individual fertility. However, they argue that introducing FR pensions would not distort the quantity/quality mix of children.
With regard to the important issue of deterministic business cycles in a competitive economy, the idea that cyclical behaviours can occur in overlapping generations (OLG) models when individuals have rational expectations is well known in the economic literature (Grandmont 1985) . This topic has been investigated in the cases of both a one-good economy (Farmer 1986; Reichlin 1986; de Vilder 1996) and a many-goods economy (Benhabib and Nishimura 1979) . However, this requires that production factors complement each other (i.e. the elasticity of capital-labour substitution should be lower than the Cobb-Douglas function) and/or consumption and leisure are gross substitutes. In contrast, with static expectations, trajectories can be oscillatory and nonconvergent to the steady state (Michel and de la Croix 2000; de la Croix and Michel 2002; Chen et al. 2008; Fanti and Spataro 2008) , only when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in the utility function is higher than one (i.e. higher than in the case of Cobb-Douglas preferences).
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Over the last few decades, there has been a growing body of literature dealing with the relationship between pensions, fertility, longevity and economic growth (e.g. Zhang et al. 2001 Zhang et al. , 2003 Pecchenino and Pollard 2005) . However, to the best of our knowledge, less attention has been devoted to studying the dynamic effects of financing public pensions in an OLG economy with endogenous fertility.
The aim of this paper is to examine the stability outcomes of the public provision of fertility-related PAYG pensions in a textbook OLG economy (Diamond 1965) when fertility is endogenous. When individuals have static expectations, we show that the introduction of a component related to individual fertility in the pension formula may cause trajectories to be oscillatory and nonconvergent for realistic parameters values. In fact, the negative effect of public pensions on capital accumulation is larger than in the case of traditional PAYG transfers, because individuals tend to increase the number of children they have (to get a larger benefit from pensions) and reduce saving. Furthermore, we extend the model to a constant inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) utility function and a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function and simulate how an increase in the relative weight of individual fertility in the pension formula affects stability outcomes for the case of Germany.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: (1) it investigates the dynamic properties of an OLG economy with endogenous fertility and fertility-related pensions and (2) it shows a novel determinant of endogenous fluctuations, which emerge even with the Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions.
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The policy implications of the findings are clear: to the extent that developed countries show a low preference for children and a high preference for future consumption (with static expectations), the often advocated reform for such countries of introducing (or extending) a fertility-related element in the public pension formula may destabilise the economy and also lead to chaotic dynamics.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 studies the local dynamic properties of the fixed point and presents numerical simulations of endogenous fluctuations. Section 4 outlines the conclusions.
The model

Government
The government redistributes resources across generations by using PAYG pensions that are partially or totally linked with the individual number of 5 Although a number of countries have introduced some forms of FR pensions for 15-20 years, it is difficult to check whether they have already brought such economies into the region of nonconvergent trajectories (as shown later in this paper). This is because our findings hold in a stylised economy, and several other reasons contribute to explain the economic cycles in real economies. In any case, the study of both the empirical evidence and case studies regarding stability outcomes is beyond the scope of this paper. children. At time t, therefore, current workers finance pensions for current pensioners, and the fertility-related PAYG (henceforth FR-PAYG) pension accounting rule (per pensioner) reads as follows:
the left-hand side ( p t ) being the pension expenditure and the right-hand side the tax receipts. In particular, w t is the wage earned by the young workers at time t, 0 < θ < 1 is the constant contribution rate and 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1 captures the weight of individual fertility (n t−1 ) with respect to average fertility (n t−1 ) in the PAYG system (Kolmar 1997; Fenge and von Weizsäcker 2010) . When ω = 0, a traditional PAYG scheme is in place. When ω = 1, pensions are completely contingent on individual fertility. Following Fenge and Meier (2005) , ω is called "the child factor".
Individuals
Consider a general equilibrium OLG closed economy populated by identical individuals of measure N t per generation. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, .... The life of a typical agent is divided into childhood and adulthood. During childhood, he/she does not make economic decisions. During adulthood, he/she works and raises children and retires when old. Young members of generation t are endowed with one unit of labour, which is inelastically supplied to firms. They receive a competitive wage w t per unit of labour. This income is used for consumption, saving, childcare and to finance pensions through taxation. Raising children is costly for young parents. The amount of resources needed to care for a child is qw t , where 0 < q < 1 is the percentage of working income devoted to child rearing (Wigger 1999; Boldrin and Jones 2002; Fanti and Gori 2012) . Therefore, the budget constraint of a young individual of generation t reads as follows:
i.e. the disposable income is divided into material consumption when young (c 1,t ), saving (s t ) and the cost of bearing n t children. When old, individuals retire and live with the amount of resources saved when young, plus interests accrued from time t to time t + 1 at the rate r e t+1 and realised pension benefits (i.e. realised consumption depends on realised factor prices). The budget constraint at time t + 1 of an individual of generation t is given by
where c 2,t+1 represents material consumption when old. The individual representative of generation t draws utility from consumption when young, consumption when old and the number of children that he/she has (Eckstein and Wolpin 1985; Eckstein et al. 1988; Galor and Weil 1996) .
6 By assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences, the individual lifetime utility function can be written as V t = c 1,t c β 2,t+1 n φ t . Through the usual logarithmic transformation, we then get
By taking factor prices and expected factor prices, the contribution rate and the average fertility rate as given, the representative individual chooses fertility and life-cycle consumption to maximise utility function (4) subject to the budget constraints (2) and (3), where 0 < β < 1 is the subjective discount factor and φ > 0 captures the parents' relative desire to have children. 7 The first-order conditions for an interior solution are given by
Equation (5) equates the marginal rate of substitution between consumption when young and consumption when old to the interest factor. Equation (6) equates the marginal rate of substitution between consumption when young and the number of children to the expected marginal cost of raising an extra child. This cost is given by the difference between the resources needed to take care of a child, minus the present value of the expected pension benefit weighted by the child factor. The higher the child factor, the lower the expected net marginal cost of raising an additional child. If ω = 0 (pure PAYG pensions), then the cost of children is determined as a share of the parent's working income. If 0 < ω ≤ 1 (FR-PAYG pensions), there is a positive effect due to a transfer of resources from the young generation to the old generation, which causes a reduction in the total cost of children.
Combining Eqs. (5) and (6) with the individual budget constraints gives the following demand for children and saving:
Equation (7) determines the individual fertility in a partial equilibrium context. An increase in the child factor causes a positive effect due to a transfer of resources from young people to old people, which reduces the marginal cost of children and increases fertility (∂n t / ∂ ω > 0). Equation (8) determines saving in a partial equilibrium context. It reveals that an increase in the child factor plays a twofold role: (1) it tends to reduce saving because individuals expect a higher pension when the number of children increases (this is represented by an increase in the public pension component in saving-the second term in brackets in the numerator of Eq. (8)); 8 (2) it tends to increase saving because a larger value of the child factor makes it more convenient to substitute consumption when young with children at time t (i.e. it reduces the denominator of Eq. (8)). However, the final (partial equilibrium) effect of an increase in the child factor on saving is negative (∂s t / ∂ω < 0).
Production and equilibrium
Identical firms act competitively on the market. The technology of production at time t combines capital (K t ) and labour (L t 
, where A > 0 and 0 < α < 1. By assuming a full depreciation of capital and knowing that output is sold at the unit price, profit maximisation yields
where k t : = K t /N t is the capital per worker. Given the government pension budget (1) and knowing that N t+1 = n t N t , the market-clearing condition in the capital market can be expressed as follows:
Combining Eqs. (7), (8) and (11), equilibrium implies
The existence of a fertility-related component in PAYG pensions has two important effects on capital accumulation: (1) it makes the crowding out effect of public pensions on saving stronger than under the traditional PAYG system (ω = 0) and (2) it introduces a potential destabilising role with regard to the subjective discount factor (β) and parents' taste for children (φ).
Before examining the dynamic analysis, some clarifications on the relationship between individual fertility and the size of pension benefits are necessary. In these models, individuals are atomistic and thus they do not take the rate of fertility of the others into account when choosing the number of children. This is clear from the pension formula (1), where a difference is made between individual fertility and average fertility. Agents are thus unable to coordinate their fertility decisions. Otherwise, they should be considered "ultra-rational", which seems to be an unusual and "clearly unrealistic" (see Cigno 1995, p. 171) assumption. In addition, relaxing the assumption of atomistic individuals would imply that the standard PAYG scheme would always coincide with a PAYG scheme that was completely contingent on the individual number of children (Cigno 1995) .
We now focus on the dynamics of capital. It is usual in OLG models to investigate how the path of capital accumulation evolves, depending on whether individuals have either rational or static expectations regarding factor prices (Michel and de la Croix 2000; de la Croix and Michel 2002) . Although static expectations represent a special condition in which all individuals are naïve, it may be in line with the same raison d'etre for the provision of public pensions which, according to Samuelson (1975) , 9 should compensate for an agent's short-sightedness. Although static expectations are recognised as appropriate in this class of models, some caveats are now necessary. Since a single period generally consists of almost 30 years in models with overlapping generations, people are frequently informed (e.g. by statistical offices) on movements of factor prices (which are dampened in an open economy), fertility rates and expected pension payments. Hence, they have plenty of time to adapt their saving behaviour.
9 "Many social security systems, like the New Deal U.S. system, may be deemed most valuable precisely because the myopia ignored by the present models does in fact prevail. People live miserably in old age because they do not realise when young what are the consequences of their private saving habits. So by democratic fiat, they paternalistically impose on themselves a withinlife pattern of consumption that favours old age at the expense of young." (Samuelson 1975, p. 543) .
Rational expectations
The expected factor prices depend on the stock of capital at time t + 1, that is
Combining Eqs. (10), (12) and (13), the dynamics of capital is driven by the following non-linear first-order difference equation:
Steady state implies k t+1 = k t = k * . Then,
Static expectations
The expected factor prices depend on the stock of capital at time t, that is
Then, from Eqs. (10), (12) and (16), the dynamics of capital is now given by
The fixed point is still determined by Eq. (15) (Michel and de la Croix 2000) . We now study the (local) stability properties of k * when individuals have static expectations (Section 3) and rational expectations (Appendix).
Local stability with static expectations
as two threshold values of the contribution rate and two threshold values of the output elasticity of capital, respectively. Then, from Eqs. (15) and (17), the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 In an OLG economy with FR-PAYG pensions and static expectations, the dynamics of capital is the following:
(1) Let 0 < α < α 3 hold. Then, θ < θ < 1 and: (2) Let α 3 < α < α 1 hold. Then, θ < 1, θ > 1 and: (3) Let α 1 < α < 1 hold. Then, θ > θ > 1, and trajectories are monotonic and convergent to k * for any 0 < θ < 1.
Proof By differentiating Eq. (17) with respect to k t and using Eq. (15), we get
Monotonic and non-monotonic dynamics. From Eq.
where θ = θ represents the value of the contribution rate below (resp. above) which trajectories are monotonic (resp. oscillatory). In addition, θ < 1 (resp. θ > 1) for any 0 < α < α 1 (resp. α 1 < α < 1). Then, θ < 1 if and only if α < α 1 and α > α 2 , where α 1 is defined by Eq. (20) and
. Since 1/2 < α 1 < 1 and α 2 > 1, the case where α > α 2 can be ruled out. Now,
Therefore, in the case of monotonic trajectories, 0 < J (k * ) < 1 for any 0 < θ < 1.
Non-monotonic dynamics: stability analysis. The condition J (k
where θ = θ > θ. Then, the fixed point is locally asymptotically stable if θ < θ. It undergoes a flip bifurcation at θ = θ, and a two-period cycle appears if θ > θ.
In particular, θ < 1 (resp. θ > 1) for any 0 < α < α 3 (resp. α 3 < α < 1). In addition, θ < 1 if and only if α < α 3 and α > α 4 , where α 3 is defined by Eq. (21), and α 4 = α 4 (β, φ, ω) := 1 2β ω 2β ω + 3φ + √ φ (8β ω + 9φ) . Since 1/3 < α 3 < α 1 and α 4 > 1 for any β, φ and 0 < ω ≤ 1, then the case where α > α 4 can be ruled out. Therefore, (1) if 0 < α < α 3 , then θ < θ < 1 and: 0 < J (k * ) < 1 for any 0 < θ < θ, −1 < J (k * ) < 0 for any θ < θ <θ, J (k * ) =−1 if and only if θ = θ and J (k * ) < − 1 for any θ < θ < 1; (2) if α 3 < α < α 1 , then θ < 1, θ > 1 and: 0 < J (k * ) < 1 for any 0 < θ < θ, and −1 < J (k * ) < 0 for any θ < θ < 1; and (3) if α 1 < α < 1, then θ > θ > 1 and 0 < J (k * ) < 1 for any 0 < θ < 1.
Proposition 1 can easily be interpreted as follows: the stock of capital at time t + 1 is determined as saving divided by the number of children at time t. Therefore, the accumulation of capital depends on the difference between the private component and the public pension component in saving, both divided by the taste for children. With logarithmic preferences, the private component in saving only depends on the marginal willingness to save out of the wage income: it reflects the positive effect on capital accumulation of a larger wage due to an increase in the stock of capital at time t (i.e. individuals increase saving through this channel). In contrast, the public pension component in saving depends on both the pension benefit and the interest factor: it reflects the crowding out effect on capital accumulation (i.e. individuals expect a larger benefit from pensions and they then reduce saving through this channel). If the private component in saving dominates (resp. is dominated by) the public pension component, trajectories are monotonic (resp. oscillatory) and the fixed point is always locally asymptotically stable (resp. it can become unstable). This happens when the weight of labour in technology is sufficiently important and the contribution rate is small enough, which is when the relative weight of labour income is large and the relative weight of pension benefits is small.
We now perform a sensitivity analysis of the critical values of the contribution rate (θ and θ) by comparing the pure PAYG pensions and FR-PAYG pensions. An analysis of Eqs. (18) and (19) gives the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The possibility of cyclical instability in an economy with FR-PAYG pensions is larger than with pure PAYG pensions. A rise in the distributive capital share, α, monotonically reduces the possibility of cyclical instability, irrespective of the pension scheme.
In addition, while with pure PAYG pensions a change in the subjective discount factor, β, and/or in the taste for children, φ, is neutral with regard to stability outcomes, with FR-PAYG pensions an increase in (resp. a reduction in) in the child factor, ω, (resp. φ) increases the possibility of cyclical instability.
2 , so that θ(α) < 1 (resp. θ (α) > 1) for any 0 < α < 1/2 (resp. 1/2 < α < 1). Then, from Eq. (18), when 0 < ω ≤ 1, the parametric region in the (α, θ) plane where trajectories are oscillatory is larger than when ω = 0. This means that when 0 < ω ≤ 1, θ(α, β, φ, ω) can be smaller than unity also when 1/2 < α < 1.
, so that θ (α) < 1 (resp. θ (α) > 1) for any 0 < α < 1/3 (resp. 1/3 < α < 1). Then, from Eq. (19), when 0 < ω ≤ 1, the parametric region in the (α, θ ) plane where trajectories are non-convergent is larger than when ω = 0. Therefore, when 0 < ω ≤ 1, the flip bifurcation value θ (α, β, φ, ω) can be smaller than unity, also when 1/3 <α <1. In addition, from Eq. (19), we get
for any 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1, and
for any 0 < ω ≤ 1.
Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1 illustrate Proposition 2. They show the different size of the parametric regions of monotonic stability and cyclical instability in Table 1 Parametric regions of cyclical instability (0 < θ < 1) under different PAYG systems
the (α, θ) plane, under pure PAYG pensions ( Fig. 1) and FR-PAYG pensions (Fig. 2) . If ω = 0, oscillatory and non-convergent trajectories are possible only when α < 1/3. In contrast, if 0 < ω ≤ 1, the parametric region where oscillatory and non-convergent trajectories are possible when α is larger than 1/3. This holds because of the destabilising effects played by both the subjective discount factor and parents' desire to have children introduced by the existence of a component contingent on individual fertility in the PAYG formula. Since α 3 (β, φ, 1) > α 3 (β, φ, ω) > 1/3, fluctuations are more likely to occur when the weight of individual fertility in the PAYG system is large.
From Proposition 2, the following results with regard to the effects of preference parameters on (local) stability outcomes can be derived.
Result 1 Given that the fertility rate is low because the parents' desire to have children (φ) is small, 10 the possibility of cyclical instability due the introduction of FR-PAYG pensions (0 < ω ≤ 1) is larger than when fertility is high because the parents' desire to have children (φ) is large.
Result 2 When the subjective discount factor is large, the possibility of cyclical instability due to the introduction of FR-PAYG pensions (0 < ω ≤ 1) is larger than when the subjective discount factor is low.
Results 1 and 2 lead to a paradoxical consequence in terms of policy. The introduction of FR-PAYG pensions is essentially advocated in economies with low fertility rates in order to overcome the sustainability issue of public pensions. Our results imply that in economies where the parents' desire to have children is small, the possibility of destabilising the economy induced by a pension reform that makes the benefit contingent on individual fertility is higher than when the parents' desire to have children is large. This is because a reduction in the taste for children reduces fertility and saving while also increasing the weight of the public pension component in capital accumulation. The causal chain of this result is the following: (1) below-replacement fertility in developed countries is one of the most important causes for recommending the introduction of fertility-related pensions, and (2) one of the reasons why fertility is low in industrialised countries is that the parents' desire to have children is small. Since fertility-related pensions are introduced essentially as a stimulus to increase fertility (in order to keep public pension budget sustainable over time), then our findings imply that the possibility of destabilisation due to FR-PAYG pensions is plausible for several real economies, as shown in the numerical examples later in the paper.
In addition, an increase in the subjective discount factor (ceteris paribus) implies that individuals want to smooth consumption over the retirement period and increase saving. However, it also causes an increase in the crowding-out effect of public pensions under a FR-PAYG system (thus acting as a destabilising device) while being neutral under a pure PAYG system. Therefore, in countries where the individual propensity to save is large and/or the parents' desire to have children is small, the introduction of a FR-PAYG scheme may cause cyclical instability and endogenous fluctuations, as shown in the next section.
Endogenous fluctuations: a numerical experiment
We now show through numerical simulations the emergence of endogenous fluctuations in an economy with FR-PAYG pensions. We take the following parameters: A = 10, α = 0.3 Gollin (2002) , β = 0.6 (Žamac 2007) , φ = 0.05, q = 0.15 and θ = 0.16 (Feldstein 2005; Cigno and Werding 2007; Liikanen 2007) .
11 The values of φ and q are "calibrated" to get a fertility rate close to the observed average values in several developed countries. In fact, with this parameter values, the long-term fertility rate is almost 0.72 (i.e. 1.44 children per couple) when ω = 1, and 0.47 (i.e. almost one child per couple) when ω = 0.5. Figure 3a -c shows the bifurcation diagrams for θ with respect to three different values of the child factor (the initial condition is k 0 = 0.1): pure PAYG pensions (ω = 0), mixed FR-PAYG pensions (ω = 0.5) and pure FR-PAYG pensions (ω = 1). The vertical axis shows the limit points of the equilibrium sequence of capital. When the contribution rate is sufficiently small, a unique limit point exists. When it increases, two-period cycles, cycles of a higher order and endogenous fluctuations are observed. As can easily be seen, the flip bifurcation value of the contribution rate dramatically reduces
(c) when the child factor is larger. In fact, under pure PAYG pensions, the fixed point undergoes a flip bifurcation at θ = 0.795, while under pure FR-PAYG pensions, a flip bifurcation emerges at θ = 0.061. This implies that the introduction of a component of pension benefits, partially or totally contingent on individual fertility, exposes an economy to oscillations in macroeconomic and demographic variables for realistic values of the contribution rate. Therefore, although fertility-related pensions are often advocated as a possible remedy against the peril of the sustainability of unfunded pensions in the near future (Sinn 2007) as well as for allocation purposes (Abio et al. 2004) , the shift from a pure PAYG system (Fig. 3a) to a PAYG system partially (Fig. 3b) or totally (Fig. 3c) linked to individual fertility may easily opens the route to endogenous fluctuations.
The CIES-CES economy
This section extends our analysis by using more general utility and production functions. We assume that individual preferences over material consumption and the number of children are characterised by a CIES utility function, and goods and services are produced through a CES production function.
Preferences
The lifetime utility of the individual representative of generation t is given by the following CIES formulation:
where σ > 0 (σ = 1) is the (constant) inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (see de la Croix and Michel 2002, for the case of exogenous fertility, and Spataro and Fanti 2011, for the case of endogenous fertility). The maximisation of Eq. (30) with respect to n t and s t subject to the budget constraints (2) and (3) gives 
Production and equilibrium
At time t, production takes place according to the CES technology
introduced by Arrow et al. (1961) , where ρ > − 1 (ρ = 0) is the degree of substitutability of the inputs, A > 0 is a scale parameter and 0 < a < 1 measures the relative weight of capital in production and determines, for any given value of ρ, the "functional distribution of income" (Arrow et al. 1961, p. 230) . 12 When − 1 < ρ < 0 (resp. ρ → − 1), capital and labour are highly substitutable (resp. perfect substitutes). In contrast, when ρ > 0 (resp. ρ → +∞), capital and labour are poor substitutes (resp. perfect complements). The limit case ρ = 0 represents the Cobb-Douglas production function. The elasticity of substitution is given by ε = 1/(1 + ρ): it is larger (resp. smaller) than unity for any − 1 < ρ < 0 (resp. ρ > 0). Consequently, Eq. (33) can also be written in per worker terms as follows:
With CES technology and competitive markets, the interest factor and the wage rate are respectively given by following equations:
The equilibrium condition in the capital market is still given by Eq. (11). Then, by combining Eqs. (31), (32) and (11), we get
By assuming static expectations and using Eqs. (35)- (37), the dynamics of capital is now described by the following non-linear difference equation:
From Eq. (38), it is clear that closed-form expressions for the steady-state stock of capital cannot be derived. This means that in a CIES-CES economy, a flip bifurcation analysis cannot be developed explicitly. However, numerical experiments show that a unique flip bifurcation value of θ exists, and the effects on stability outcomes of an increase in the child factor ω are qualitatively the same as those studied in an economy with logarithmic preferences and CobbDouglas technology. In addition, the use of a CIES-CES model economy with pensions introduces a role for the elasticity of substitution parameters on stability outcomes. In particular, ceteris paribus, (1) for any ρ > − 1 (ρ = 0), an increase in σ plays a destabilising (resp. stabilising) role when σ > 1 (resp. σ < 1), i.e. it reduces (resp. increases) the flip bifurcation value of θ . This is in line with Michel and de la Croix (2000) in a model without pensions and (2) for any σ > 0(σ = 1), an increase in the absolute value of ρ plays a destabilising (resp. stabilising) role when ρ > 0 (resp. −1 < ρ < 0), i.e. it reduces (resp. increases) the flip bifurcation value of θ. Unlike Michel and de la Croix (2000) , this last result is unique to our model with public pensions. Below, we concentrate on the role played by the child factor on the local stability of the fixed point, rather than making a stability analysis of the elasticity of substitution parameters.
Since elements of fertility-related pensions exist (amongst others) in Germany, we now simulate how an increase in the weight of the child factor affects long-term dynamics in the case of the German economy. We calibrate the values of preference, technology and policy parameters to match German macroeconomic and demographic data. Of course, we are aware that our model economy is highly stylised. Therefore, numerical experiments are performed without claiming that the results can be interpreted as possible practical policy suggestions.
Discussions regarding the choice of parameter values are now needed. Empirical estimates of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (σ ) are generally very varied, stemming from the fact that microeconomic studies come to different conclusions than macroeconomic studies, which use aggregate data. On the one hand, there are estimates of σ very close to zero, i.e. Hall (1988) for the USA, Blundell-Wignall et al. (1995) and Lund and Engsted (1996) for Germany, Girardin et al. (2000) for France and Hyde and Cuthberston (2003) for both Germany and France. However, the omission of durable consumption goods following Hall's approach may cause a downward bias in the estimates (Ogaki and Reinhart 1998) . To avoid this problem, Marquez de la Cruz et al. (2007) employ (i) the real interest rate and (ii) the rate of return of the stock index for Germany and thus find an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of almost 1.6 in case (i) (resp. 1.3 in case (ii)) of Germany.
13 For our purposes, we use σ = 1.3 for Germany.
The estimates of the elasticity of substitution in production (ρ) are also controversial, ranging from values below or above unity. This essentially depends on whether time-series or cross-section analyses are performed. However, Lucas (1969) argues for the USA that while cross-section studies support the Cobb-Douglas function, older time-series studies generally provided lower estimates of the elasticity of substitution. More recently, Chirinko et al. (1999) , with a cross-section analysis based on microdata, found low values of the elasticity of substitution in production, ranging from 0.25 to 0.40, i.e. capital and labour tend to sufficiently complement each other. Therefore, with regard to technology parameters, we chose the scale parameter (A = 15), the distributive parameter (a = 0.5) 14 and the degree of substitutability of the inputs (ρ = 0.55), 15 to obtain a value of the output elasticity of capital around of 0.3. With regard to the preference parameters, the parents' desire to have children (φ = 0.6) and the subjective discount factor (β = 0.6) are chosen to match both the fertility behaviour in Germany (we thus set the percentage of working income devoted to child rearing at q = 0.3), which shows an average fertility rate of around 0.67, i.e. 1.35 children per couple (see Cigno and Werding 2007, Fig. 1.1, p. 2), and a household saving rate of almost 12 %. The evolution of household savings is very different in Germany from other European countries. The German saving rate decreased in 1985-2005 and is currently similar, for example, to the saving rate in France, which is around 11-12 % of disposable income (Hiebert 2006, p. 1), which, in contrast, increased in the same period. Finally, the contribution rate to the PAYG system is fixed at θ = 0.195 (Cigno and Werding 2007) . For the set of parameters that resembles the German macroeconomic and demographic variables, the bifurcation diagram plotted in Fig. 4 shows the limit points of the long-term sequence of capital when the child factor increases. The figure shows that the fixed point is locally asymptotically stable when ω is low, it undergoes a flip bifurcation at ω = ω = 0.31 and a two-period cycle then appears for values of ω that range between 0.31 and (almost) 1. Cycles of a higher order and endogenous fluctuations can be observed when ω > 1. 16 In addition, Fig. 5a , b depicts the time evolution of long-term fertility for the parameter values discussed above. The figures clearly show that when the child factor is small (ω = 0.2), fertility oscillates between 0.48 and 0.6 and approaches the long-term values (Fig. 5a) . In contrast, when the child factor is larger (ω = 0.5), fertility oscillates permanently from 0.525 and 0.725 (Fig. 5b) .
Conclusions
We have analysed the dynamics of an overlapping generations economy with endogenous fertility and fertility-related pay-as-you-go public pensions with both rational and static expectations. We have shown that introducing a component contingent on individual fertility in the pension formula dramatically increases the possibility of cyclical instability when individuals have static expectations compared to pure PAYG pensions.
We also found that that the use of fertility-related pensions, which are often advocated as a remedy against low fertility, act as a destabilising device especially when fertility is low because the parents' desire to have children is small and the subjective discount factor is high. Numerical simulations for realistic parameter values show that oscillations in macroeconomic and demographic variables can be a plausible scenario when FR-PAYG pensions are operative.
Our findings constitute a policy warning regarding the possible (cyclical) instability caused by the introduction of fertility-related elements in PAYG pensions. They also provide a further explanation of the occurrence of persistent (deterministic) cycles in economies with endogenous fertility.
